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use#LAARARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY*
ROBERT J. BARRO
The potential for rare economic disasters explains a lot of asset-pricing
puzzles. I calibrate disaster probabilities from the twentieth century global his-
tory, especially the sharp contractions associated with World War I, the Great
Depression, and World War II. The puzzles that can be explained include the high
equity premium, low risk-free rate, and volatile stock returns. Another mystery
that may be resolved is why expected real interest rates were low in the United
States during major wars, such as World War II. The model, an extension of work
by Rietz, maintains the tractable framework of a representative agent, time-
additive and isoelastic preferences, and complete markets. The results hold with
i.i.d. shocks to productivity growth in a Lucas-tree type economy and also with the
inclusion of capital formation.
The Mehra-Prescott [1985] article on the equity risk-pre-
mium puzzle has received a great deal of attention. An article
published three years later by Rietz [1988] purported to solve the
puzzle by bringing in low-probability economic disasters, such as
the Great Depression. I think that Rietz’s basic reasoning is
correct, but the profession seems to think differently, as gauged
by the continued attempts to ﬁnd more and more complicated
ways to resolve the equity-premium puzzle.
I think the major reason for skepticism about Rietz’s argu-
ment is the belief that it depends on counterfactually high prob-
abilities and sizes of economic disasters. Thus, a key aspect of my
empirical analysis is the measurement of the frequency and sizes
of the international economic disasters that occurred during the
twentieth century. The three principal events are World War I,
the Great Depression, and World War II, but post-World War II
depressions have also been signiﬁcant outside of OECD countries.
My analysis of these events suggests a disaster probability of
1.5–2 percent per year with a distribution of declines in per capita
GDP ranging between 15 percent and 64 percent.
I construct a model of the equity premium that extends Lucas
[1978], Mehra and Prescott [1985], and Rietz [1988]. I then cali-
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823brate the model using the observed probability distribution for
economic disasters in the twentieth century. The model’s solution
gets into the right ballpark for explaining the equity-premium
and related asset-market puzzles, such as the low real rate of
return on government bills. Another mystery that may be re-
solved is why expected real interest rates were low in the United
States during major wars, such as World War II.
I. A LUCAS TREE MODEL WITH RARE DISASTERS
I.A. Setup of the Model
Following Mehra and Prescott [1985], I use a version of
Lucas’ [1978] representative-agent, fruit-tree model of asset pric-
ing with exogenous, stochastic production. Output of fruit in
period t is At. In the initial version of the model, the number of
trees is ﬁxed; that is, there is neither investment nor deprecia-
tion. Since the economy is closed and all output is consumed,
consumption Ct equals At.
One form of asset in period t is an equity claim on period t 
1’s output, At1. This asset is a claim on one dividend, not the
tree itself. However, because of the i.i.d. assumptions made later,
the expected rate of return on this one-period claim will be the
same as that on a tree claim. If the period t price of the one-period
equity claim in units of period t’s fruit is denoted by Pt1, the
one-period gross return on this asset is
(1) Rt1
e  At1/Pt1.
I assume that property rights are secure, so that the claim en-
sures ownership over next period’s fruit At1 with probability
one.
There is also an asset that guarantees a risk-free return in
normal times but on which partial default occurs on rare occa-
sions. I view this asset as a government bill. The face return
delivered in normal times is denoted by Rt1
f . I detail later the
assumptions about default probability.
The representative consumer maximizes a time-additive util-
ity function with isoelastic utility:
(2) Ut  Et
i0

e
i  uCti	,
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(3) uC  C
1
  1/1  
.
In these expressions,   0 is the rate of time preference, and 

0 is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion and the reciprocal of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption.
The usual ﬁrst-order optimization condition implies that
(4) uCt  e
  EtuCt1  Rt1	,
where Rt1 is the one-period gross return on any asset traded at
date t. Using (4), substituting C  A, and replacing Rt1 by the
formula for Rt1
e in (1) yields
(5) At

  e
  1/Pt1  EtAt1
1
	.
Therefore, the price of the one-period equity claim is given by
(6) Pt1  e
  At

  EtAt1
1
	.
The log of output (productivity) evolves as a random walk
with drift,
(7) log At1  log At    ut1  vt1,
where   0. The random term ut1 is i.i.d. normal with mean 0
and variance 
2. This term gives results similar to those of Mehra
and Prescott. I assume that  and  are known. Weitzman [2005]
argues that learning about  is important for asset pricing—this
idea is not pursued here. However, Weitzman’s model generates
“fat tails” that have effects analogous to rare disasters.
The random term vt1 picks up low-probability disasters, as
in Rietz [1988]. In these events, output jumps down sharply, such
as in the Great Depression. The probability of a disaster is the
known amount p  0 per unit of time, where p is a constant. The
probability of more than one disaster in a period is assumed to be
small enough to neglect—later, the arbitrary period length
shrinks to zero. If a disaster occurs, output contracts proportion-
ately by the fraction b. The idea is that the probability of disaster
in a period is small but b is large. The distribution of vt1 is given
by
probability e
p: vt1  0,
probability 1  e
p: vt1  log 1  b.
The contraction proportion b—the size of the downward jump in
825 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETSoutput—is a random variable, calibrated later to accord with the
distribution of observed economic depressions during the twenti-
eth century.
The speciﬁcation for vt creates negative skewness in the
distribution of At1, because disasters are not offset in a proba-
bilistic sense by bonanzas. However, the asset-pricing results are
similar for a symmetric speciﬁcation in which favorable events of
size b also occur with probability p. With diminishing marginal
utility of consumption, bonanzas do not count nearly as much as
disasters for the pricing of assets.
I.B. Economic Disasters in the Twentieth Century
Actual and potential economic disasters could reﬂect eco-
nomic events (the Great Depression, ﬁnancial crises), wartime
destruction (world wars, nuclear conﬂicts), natural disasters (tsu-
namis, hurricanes, earthquakes, asteroid collisions), and epidem-
ics of disease (Black Death, avian ﬂu). I use the twentieth-century
history of economic disasters to assess disaster probabilities,
sizes of contractions, and default probabilities.
A prototype economic disaster is the Great Depression, which
featured a large, global economic decline that did not trigger
default on assets such as government bills.
1 However, from the
standpoint of sizes of world economic disasters in the twentieth
century, war has been more important than purely economic
contractions. For the United States, at least since 1815 and aside
from the Confederacy during the Civil War, wars did not involve
massive destruction of domestic production capacity. In fact,
some wars, especially World War II, featured robust economic
activity. However, the history for many other OECD countries is
very different, notably for World Wars I and II.
Part A of Table I shows all episodes of 15 percent or greater
decline in real per capita GDP in the twentieth century for twenty
OECD countries covered over a long period by Maddison [2003].
2
1. In the United States, the rise in the gold price and abrogation of gold
clauses in bond contracts may be viewed as forms of partial default; see McCulloch
[1980].
2. The present model lacks investment, government purchases, and net ex-
ports; therefore, GDP and consumption coincide. More generally, it would be
preferable to measure consumption rather than GDP to relate the data to the
model. However, GDP data are much more plentiful for long-term analyses.
826 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSThis group comprises the major economies of Western Europe
plus Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.
3
In the model, an economic disaster corresponds to a down-
ward jump in per capita GDP at an instant of time. In the data,
the declines are stretched out over time, such as 1939–1945 for
some countries during World War II. In using the data to cali-
brate the model, there is no reason to focus on falls in per capita
GDP over a ﬁxed interval of time, such as a calendar year (over
which the data happen to be assembled). Table I measures de-
clines in per capita GDP over consecutive years, such as 1939–
1945. My reasoning is that the start of a war, such as World War
II for Western Europe in 1939, puts a country into a regime
where, with much higher probability than usual, output falls
sharply over the next several years. The exact outcome depends
on whether the country wins or loses, the extent of destruction of
property and life, and so on. These features and the length of the
war are unknown initially.
A reasonable way to model this kind of disaster is that, with
probability p per unit of time, a country enters into a war state,
which leads to an ultimate contraction in per capita GDP by the
proportionate amount b. The duration of the disaster—for exam-
ple, one year or ﬁve—may be secondary. (In a later section I
assess this effect by considering the length of the period in the
model.) Therefore, the cumulative decline in per capita GDP
during each war should provide a reasonable estimate of b. The
associated disaster probability corresponds to the number of wars
(say, per century) that featured these sharp cumulative contrac-
tions, rather than the fraction of years in which a country was
involved in this kind of war. I take a similar approach to purely
economic depressions, such as the Great Depression. These
events typically involve ﬁnancial crises, which are similar in
some respects to wars.
Ten of the contractions in part A of Table I were associated
3. Kehoe and Prescott [2002] extend the concept of a depression to cases
where the growth rate of real per capita GDP fell well below the historical average
for an extended period. Thus, they classify as depressions the periods of slow
economic growth in New Zealand and Switzerland from the 1970s to the 1990s.
Hayashi and Prescott [2002] take a similar approach to Japan in the 1990s. These
experiences can be brought into the present framework by allowing for a small
probability of a substantial cutback in the productivity growth parameter .
However, the potential for this kind of change turns out not to “work,” because—
with the parameter 
 in the reasonable range where 
1—a decline in 
(applying to the whole world) turns out to raise the price-earnings ratio for stocks.
Also, the equity premium is independent of .
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DECLINES OF 15 PERCENT OR MORE IN REAL PER CAPITA GDP
Part A: Twenty OECD Countries in Maddison [2003]
Event Country Years
% fall in real
per capita
GDP
World War I Austria 1913–1919 35
Belgium 1916–1918 30
Denmark 1914–1918 16
Finland 1913–1918 35
France 1916–1918 31
Germany 1913–1919 29
Netherlands 1913–1918 17
Sweden 1913–1918 18
Great Depression Australia 1928–1931 20
Austria 1929–1933 23
Canada 1929–1933 33
France 1929–1932 16
Germany 1928–1932 18
Netherlands 1929–1934 16
New Zealand 1929–1932 18
United States 1929–1933 31
Spanish Civil War Portugal 1934–1936 15
Spain 1935–1938 31
World War II Austria 1944–1945 58
Belgium 1939–1943 24
Denmark 1939–1941 24
France 1939–1944 49
Germany 1944–1946 64
Greece 1939–1945 64
Italy 1940–1945 45
Japan 1943–1945 52
Netherlands 1939–1945 52
Norway 1939–1944 20
Aftermaths of wars Canada 1917–1921 30
Italy 1918–1921 25
United Kingdom 1918–1921 19
United Kingdom 1943–1947 15
United States 1944–1947 28
Part B: Eight Latin American and Seven Asian Countries in Maddison [2003]
World War I Argentina 1912–1917 29
Chile 1912–1915 16
Chile 1917–1919 23
Uruguay 1912–1915 30
Venezuela 1913–1916 17
828 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSTABLE I
(CONTINUED)
Event Country Years
% fall in real
per capita
GDP
Great Depression Argentina 1929–1932 19
Chile 1929–1932 33
Mexico 1926–1932 31
Peru 1929–1932 29
Uruguay 1930–1933 36
Venezuela 1929–1932 24
Malaysia 1929–1932 17
Sri Lanka 1929–1932 15
World War II Peru 1941–1943 18
Venezuela 1939–1942 22
Indonesia* 1941–1949 36
Malaysia** 1942–1947 36
Philippines*** 1940–1946 59
South Korea 1938–1945 59
Sri Lanka 1943–1946 21
Taiwan 1942–1945 51
Post-WWII Depressions Argentina 1979–1985 17
Argentina 1998–2002 21
Chile 1971–1975 24
Chile 1981–1983 18
Peru 1981–1983 17
Peru 1987–1992 30
Uruguay 1981–1984 17
Uruguay 1998–2002 20
Venezuela 1977–1985 24
Indonesia 1997–1999 15
Philippines 1982–1985 18
Mean for 60 contractions (excluding 5 war aftermaths in part A) 29
Part A uses data from Maddison [2003] for twenty OECD countries for 1900–2000: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Switzerland (11
percent in 1915–1918 and 10 percent in 1929–1932) had no 15 percent events. With the war aftermaths
excluded, the United Kingdom also lacked 15 percent events, and the largest contraction was 7 percent in
1929–1931. Satisfactory data for Ireland are unavailable until after World War II. Data for Greece are
missing around World War I, 1914–1920, and also for 1901–1912.
Part B covers eight Latin American and seven Asian countries that have nearly continuous data from
Maddison [2003] at least from before World War I. The sample is Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan.
Data for Argentina and Uruguay after 2001 are from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Data. Countries
that had no 15 percent events are Brazil (13 percent in 1928–1931, 13 percent in 1980–1983), Colombia
(9 percent in 1913–1915), and India (11 percent in 1916–1920, 12 percent in 1943–1948). Data for Peru
appear to be unreliable before the mid-1920s.
Adjustments were made by Maddison to account for changes in country borders.
* No data available for 1942–1948.
** No data available for 1941–1945.
*** No data available for 1943–1946.
829 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETSwith World War II, eight with World War I, eight with the Great
Depression, and one or two with the Spanish Civil War.
4 There
are also ﬁve aftermaths of wars—three after World War I and two
after World War II. However, these experiences involved demo-
bilizations with substantial declines in government purchases
and—with the possible exception of Canada after World War
I—did not feature decreases in real consumer expenditure.
5
Therefore, I exclude the war aftermaths from the subsequent
analysis.
Although 15 percent or greater declines in real per capita
GDP are rare, only Switzerland among the twenty OECD coun-
tries lacked any such events in the twentieth century (see the
notes to Table I).
6 The striking observation from part A of Table
I is the dramatic decreases in per capita GDP during the major
wars and the Great Depression. In addition, the sharp expansions
of government purchases during the wars suggest that consump-
tion fell proportionately by more than GDP (although investment
likely declined sharply and net imports may have increased in
some cases).
Part B of Table I shows declines of 15 percent or more in real
per capita GDP for ﬁfteen additional countries—eight in Latin
America and seven in Asia—that have nearly continuous data
from Maddison [2003] back at least before World War I. These
countries had eleven sharp economic contractions in the post-
World War II period, eight during the Great Depression, eight in
World War II, and ﬁve around World War I.
7 Of the ﬁfteen
4. I am unsure whether the fall in real per capita GDP in Portugal by 9
percent in 1935–1936 reﬂected spillovers from the Spanish Civil War. Per capita
GDP happened also to decline by 6 percent in Portugal in 1934–1935.
5. For the United States, data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis show
that real consumer expenditure did not decline from 1944 to 1947. The same holds
for real consumer expenditure from 1918 to 1921 and 1943 to 1947 in the United
Kingdom (see Feinstein [1972]) and for 1918–1921 in Italy (see Rossi, Sorgato,
and Toniolo [1993]). Long-term national-accounts data for Canada from Urquhart
[1993] do not break down GDP into expenditure components. However, my esti-
mate from Urquhart’s data is that real consumer expenditure per person fell by
about 18 percent from 1917 to 1921, compared with the decline by 30 percent in
real GDP per person in Table I.
6. With the war aftermaths excluded, the United Kingdom also lacked a 15
percent event.
7. Data are available for a few additional countries starting in the 1920s and
for many countries after World War II. In terms of 15 percent events, this
extension adds 6 cases associated with the Great Depression (Costa Rica, Cuba, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), 4 during World War II (Costa
Rica, Guatemala, Burma, and China), 1 aftermath of World War II (Paraguay),
and 30 post-World War II depressions (about half war related) outside of sub-
Saharan Africa. Among all of these additional cases, the largest contractions were
830 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICScountries considered, three lacked 15 percent events (see the
notes to the table).
Figure I, panel A, uses the information from Table I to plot
the size distribution of contractions in the range from 15–19
percent to 60–64 percent. There are 60 events for the 35 coun-
tries over 100 years. Thus, the probability of entering into a 15
percent or greater event was 1.7 percent per year. For contrac-
tions of 30 percent or more, the number was 24, and for 45 percent
or more, the number was 10.
8
For some purposes, it is appropriate to adjust the economic
contractions for trend growth. Table I, part B, shows the distri-
bution of the adjusted numbers, based on a trend growth rate for
real per capita GDP of 2.5 percent per year. As an example, a
contraction by 35 percent over ﬁve years corresponds to a con-
traction relative to trend by 43 percent. The mean of the adjusted
contraction sizes is 0.35, compared with 0.29 for the raw
numbers.
The lower bound of 15 percent for large contractions is arbi-
trary. For example, the 35 countries considered in Table I had an
additional 21 cases of contraction in the range from 10 percent to
14 percent.
9 However, the inclusion of these smaller contractions
turns out to have a minor effect on the model’s predictions for
rates of return.
Table II reports realized real rates of return on stocks and
bills during the contractions shown in Table I. Stock returns are
computed from total-return indexes, except that the values
75 percent for Iraq (1987–1991), 46 percent for Burma (1938–1950), 45 percent for
Iran (1976–1981), and 44 percent for West Bank/Gaza (1999–2003). There were
also 25 declines of 15 percent or more in real per capita GDP in the 1990s for
transitions of former Communist countries.
8. Since worldwide disturbances are the important force in the model, a
different way to count is to consider only the three global shocks—World War I,
the Great Depression, and World War II. The twentieth century frequency of
entering into this kind of global disturbance was 3 percent per year. The size of
each global shock would be a weighted average of the declines in per capita GDP
shown in Table I along with the smaller decreases for the roughly one-half of
countries that did not experience 15 percent events at these times.
9. The list is Australia 11 percent in 1913–1918 and 14 percent in 1943–1946,
Belgium 10 percent in 1928–1932, Brazil 13 percent in 1928–1931 and 13 percent
in 1980–1983, Finland 10 percent in 1938–1940 and 12 percent in 1989–1993,
India 11 percent in 1916–1920 and 12 percent in 1943–1948, Indonesia 14 percent
in 1929–1934, New Zealand 11 percent in 1907–1909 and 12 percent in 1947–
1948, Norway 14 percent in 1916–1918, Philippines 12 percent in 1913–1915,
Portugal 11 percent in 1927–1928, Switzerland 11 percent in 1915–1918 and 10
percent in 1929–1932, Taiwan 12 percent in 1928–1931, Uruguay 10 percent in
1941–1943 and 10 percent in 1958–1959, and Venezuela 11 percent in 1986–1989.
831 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETSPanel A: Contractions in Table I
Panel B: Contractions in Table I adjusted for trend growth
FIGURE I
Frequency Distribution of Economic Disasters
The histograms apply to the 35 countries covered over the twentieth century in
Table I. The horizontal axis has intervals for declines in real per capita GDP. The
vertical axis shows the number of economic contractions in each interval. The ﬁve
war aftermaths shown in Table I are excluded; therefore, 60 events are used. The
bottom panel adjusts for trend growth at 0.0252 per year.
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STOCK AND BILL RETURNS DURING ECONOMIC CRISES
Event
Real stock return
(% per year)
Real bill return
(% per year)
World War I
Austria, 1914–1918 — 4.1
Denmark, 1914–1918 — 6.9
France, 1914–1918 5.7 9.3
Germany, 1914–1918 26.4 15.6
Netherlands, 1914–1918 — 5.2
Sweden, 1914–1918 15.9* 13.1
Great Depression
Australia, 1928–1930 3.6 8.2
Austria, 1929–1932 17.3* 7.1
Canada, 1929–1932 23.1* 7.1
Chile, 1929–1931 22.3* —
France, 1929–1931 20.5 1.4
Germany, 1928–1931 14.8 9.3
Netherlands, 1929–1933 14.2* 5.7
New Zealand, 1929–1931 5.6* 11.9
United States, 1929–1932 16.5 9.3
Spanish Civil War
Portugal, 1934–1936 13.4* 3.8
World War II
Denmark, 1939–1945 3.7* 2.2
France, 1943–1945 29.3 22.1
Italy, 1943–1945 33.9 52.6
Japan, 1939–1945 2.3 8.7
Norway, 1939–1945 1.7* 4.5
Post-WWII Depressions
Argentina, 1998–2001 3.6 9.0
Chile, 1981–1982 37.0* 14.0
Indonesia, 1997–1998 44.5 9.6
Philippines, 1982–1984 24.3 5.0
Thailand, 1996–1997** 48.9 6.0
Venezuela, 1976–1984 8.6* —
Real rates of return on stocks and bills are for periods corresponding to the economic contractions in
Table I. For the Great Depression and post-World War II depressions, the periods are from the start of the
depression to the year before the rebound in the economy. For the world wars, the periods are 1914–1918 and
1939–1945, except for France and Italy where data for 1939–1942 are problematic. The returns are averages
of arithmetic annual real rates of return based on total-return indexes, except the entries marked by an
asterisk used stock-price indexes. Real values were computed by using consumer price indexes. Data are from
Global Financial Data, except that the nominal return on bills for Indonesia in 1997–1998 is for money-
market rates from EIU Country Data.
* Based on stock-price indexes, rather than total-return indexes.
** Thailand’s contraction of real per capita GDP by 14 percent for 1996–1998 falls just short of the 15
percent criterion used in Table I.
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fore, neglect dividends). The bills data are usually for short-term
government bills but sometimes for money-market instruments
or certiﬁcates of deposit. Real values were computed by using
consumer price indexes. Out of the 60 cases in Table I (not
counting the 5 war aftermaths), full data on asset returns are
available for 21 cases. Information also appears in Table II for
1996–1997 for Thailand, which was not included in Table I.
Another ﬁve cases in Table II have returns for stocks or bills but
not both.
For the Great Depression I measured returns up to the year
before the rebound in the economy. The average real rate of
return was 15.3 percent per year for stocks (nine cases) and 7.5
percent per year for bills (eight cases). Thus, stocks did badly, and
bills did well.
For the post-World War II depressions in part B of Table I, I
again calculate returns up to the year before the rebound in the
economy. The average real rate of return was 27.8 percent per
year for stocks (six cases) and 6.7 percent per year for bills (ﬁve
cases).
10 Thus, again, stocks did badly, and bills did compara-
tively well.
For the world wars, the returns shown in Table II are for the
war periods, 1914–1918 and 1939–1945, except where data are
unreliable (France and Italy for 1939–1942). In World War I,
average real returns were 16.0 percent per year for stocks
(three cases) and 9.0 percent per year for bills (six cases).
11 In
World War II, averages for ﬁve cases were 13.5 percent per year
for stocks and 18.0 percent per year for bills. Overall, the
wartime pattern is that real rates of return were sharply negative
on both forms of assets, and no clear pattern of relative perfor-
mance emerges. These conclusions still hold if the intervals for
returns are aligned more closely to the times of economic contrac-
tion, rather than the full war periods.
Finally, in Portugal during the Spanish Civil War, real re-
10. Partial default on Argentine government bonds occurred after the end
date, 2001, used in Table II. For 1998–2002, the average real rates of return were
3.7 percent per year for stocks and 0.1 percent per year for bills.
11. The impact of the German hyperinﬂation came in 1920–1923, after the
end date, 1918, used in Table II. For 1920–1922, the average annual real rate of
return on German stocks was 50.7 percent, while that on bills was 56.2
percent. Thus, surprisingly, stocks did almost as badly in real terms as bills. The
data for 1923, the peak year of the hyperinﬂation, are unreliable, though stocks
clearly did far better in real terms than in 1922.
834 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSturns were 13.4 percent per year on stocks and 3.8 percent per
year on bills. Thus, although this noncombatant country had a
signiﬁcant economic contraction (Table I), the asset returns were
not low.
The overall conclusion is that government bills outperformed
stocks in most economic crises unrelated to war—represented by
the Great Depression and post-World War II depressions in Latin
America and Asia. However, bills were not systematically better
or worse than stocks during economic contractions related to
major wars.
12
I.C. Default Probability
The disaster shock vt can account for the behavior of stock
returns during economic contractions of the sort considered in
Table I. However, the low returns on government bills during
some wartime contractions depend on another factor, akin to
partial default or loss of property rights. Outright default on
government paper does not typify the twenty OECD economies
considered in part A of the table—which notably omits Czarist
Russia and the American Confederacy.
13 For example, France
did not default after World War II on debts incurred by the
Third Republic or the Vichy government, and Belgium and the
Netherlands did not explicitly default after World War II on
government bonds but did have forced conversions into illiquid
instruments. The most common mechanism for partial default
was depreciation of the real value of nominal debt through high
inﬂation, which occurred during and shortly after some wartime
experiences.
14
Default probability can be introduced in a number of ways. I
make the following assumptions. First, default never occurs in
normal times but occurs with a constant probability q  0 when
a v-type disaster occurs. (The probability q is a pure number,
12. Better performing assets in these circumstances would be precious com-
modities, such as gold and diamonds, and maybe Swiss bank accounts and human
capital.
13. The Bolshevik government repudiated Russian government bonds in
1918, and the U. S. government repudiated Confederate bonds in the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratiﬁed in 1868.
14. Notable are the hyperinﬂations in the early 1920s in Germany and
Austria, likely due to Reparations payments imposed after World War I, rather
than the war directly. High inﬂation also occurred during and after World War I
in France and during or after World War II in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Greece, Italy, and Japan. In West Germany, suppressed inﬂation associated with
World War II was effectively ratiﬁed by a 10:1 currency conversion and the lifting
of price controls in 1948.
835 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETSwhereas the probability p is per unit of time.) Second, when a
default occurs, the fraction d of the gross return on bills is wiped
out. Third, default never applies to equities.
15 Fourth, default
does not affect productivity, At1, and, hence, real GDP. The
proceeds from default are returned as lump-sum transfers to the
representative consumer. Given these assumptions, the gross
return Rt1
b on government bills is as follows:
probability e
p: Rt1
b  the specified face amount, Rt1
f ,
probability 1  e
p: probability 1  q: Rt1
b
 Rt1
f , probability q: Rt1
b  1  d  Rt1
b .
I.D. Calibration of Disaster Parameters
Economic disasters are characterized by four objects: the
probability of disaster, p per year, the size of contraction, b, the
probability of default (contingent on the occurrence of disaster),
q, and the extent of default, d. I use the historical patterns from
Tables I and II and Figure I to generate reasonable values for
these objects.
The frequency of disasters (60 occurrences for 35 countries
over 100 years) implies a baseline value for p of 1.7 percent per
year. The contraction sizes, b, from Table I and Figure I indicate
a range of 15 percent to 64 percent. I use the empirical frequency
distribution in Figure I, panel A, to calibrate the model for b. (In
a later analysis I use the distribution for the trend-adjusted
values shown in panel B.) I assume that, contingent on a disaster,
the probability distribution for b is the same at all points in time.
The mean of the proportionate contractions shown in Figure I,
panel A, is 0.29. However, the empirical counterpart of b is not
the mean. Because of diminishing marginal utility of consump-
tion, larger contractions count more than smaller ones; hence, the
effective average value of b exceeds 0.29.
Table II suggests that some form of partial default on gov-
ernment bills (typically through inﬂation) is likely during eco-
15. In some circumstances, particularly involving wars and changes of gov-
ernment, property rights on equity shares can be threatened. One example, not
included in the data set, is the Russian Revolution of 1917. Another case involves
the German hyperinﬂation, where the real value of stocks declined sharply
through 1922. Bresciani-Turroni [1937, p. 265] observed that the capitalized value
of Daimler Motors fell to the equivalent of 327 cars. Explanations that have been
offered include potential future corporate liability for reparations payments and
the possible loss of ownership rights due to the introduction of Communism.
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is less likely for wartime contractions in which the country was
not directly involved in the conﬂict. Experiences of this type in
Table I are Portugal during the Spanish Civil War and Latin
America during World Wars I and II. Based on this reasoning, 25
of the 60 events (42 percent) shown in Table I featured partial
default on bills. Thus, a reasonable number for q, the conditional
default probability on bills, is 0.4.
Table II shows that, during major wartime contractions, av-
erage real returns on bills were similar to those on stocks. To get
this pattern in the model, the size of partial default, d, has to be
close to the size of economic contraction, b. Therefore, I assume
that d  b in the calibration exercises.
I.E. Solution of the Model
Given the process for At1 in (7) and the assumed distribu-
tions for ut1 and vt1, (6) determines the price of the one-period
equity claim. The result is
(8) Pt1  Ate

11/2
122  e
p  1  e
p  E1  b
1
	,
where E denotes the expectation operator.
The expected gross return on one-period equity is Et(Rt1
e ) 
Et(At1)/Pt1. I focus on the expected rate of return that applies
asymptotically as the arbitrary period length approaches zero.
The result is
(9) log EtRt1
e 	    
  1/2

2
2  

2
 p  E1  b
1
  1  Eb	.
For a sample conditioned on no disasters, the expected rate of
return is higher by p  Eb:
(10) log EtRt1
e 	vt10    
  1/2

2
2  

2
 p  E1  b
1
  1	.
The face rate of return on government bills, Rt1
f , can be
determined from (4). As the period length approaches zero, this
rate of return is
(11) log Rt1
f     
  1/2

2
2  p  1  q  E1  b


 q  E1  b
1
  1	.
Note that the derivation of (11) assumes that the default size d
837 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETSequals the size of economic contraction b.
16 The full expected rate
of return on bills, which includes the default possibility, is lower
by pq  Eb:
(12) log EtRt1
b 	    
  1/2

2
2  p  1  q  E1  b


 q  E1  b
1
  q  Eb  1	.
The 
 part of the rates of return in (9)–(12) corresponds
to the steady-state real interest rate in the deterministic neoclas-
sical growth model (p  0). The equity premium, log
[Et(Rt1
e )]  log [Et(Rt1
b )], is given from (9) and (12) by
(13) equity premium  

2  p  1  q
 E1  b
  E1  b
1
  Eb	.
For a sample conditioned on no disasters (and, therefore, also no
defaults), the premium can be calculated from (10) and (11) as
(14) equity premiumvt10  

2  p  1  q
 E1  b

  E1  b
1
	.
The equity premiums in (13) and (14) are increasing in p and 

and decreasing in q. The premiums are also higher if the distri-
bution of b shifts toward larger values.
Because ut and vt are i.i.d., the results take the same form for
longer term claims. The price of an equity claim that pays At2 in
period t  2 looks like (8), except that the expression in the ﬁrst
brackets is multiplied by two, and the expression in the second
brackets enters as a square. The expected rate of return on this
two-period claim (and on claims further into the future) is still
given by (9) and (10). Similarly, rates of return on bills that pay
out in periods t  2 ,...,a r estill given by (11) and (12). That is,
with the i.i.d. speciﬁcation, the term structure of interest rates is
ﬂat.
17
An equity share on a tree is a claim on the stream of “divi-
dends,” At1, At2,....T h eprice of this asset equals the sum of
the prices of the claims on each period’s dividend (output).
Deﬁning
16. The probability of default, q, is assumed to be independent of b. However,
the pricing formula depends on qd. Therefore, the results would be the same if d
were ﬁxed but q rose in proportion to b.
17. The assumption is that a two-period bill has two chances of default in
proportionate size d. Each chance is with probability q contingent on the occur-
rence of a disaster in period t  1o rt  2.
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
11/2
122  e
p  1  e
p  E1  b
1
	,
which appears in (8), the formula for the share price is
Pt  At  /1  ,
so that the “price-earnings ratio” Pt/At is
(16) Pt/At  /1  .
As the period length approaches zero, the P-E ratio approaches
18
(17)
Pt
At

1
  
  1  1/2
  1
2
2  p  E1  b
1
  1	
.
The model also determines the expected growth rate of the
economy. Using (7) and allowing the period length to approach
zero, the expected growth rate is
(18) log EtAt1/At	    1/2
2  p  Eb.
Thus, the expected growth rate is decreasing in p and Eb. For a
sample conditioned on no disasters, the expected growth rate is
higher by p  Eb:
(19) log EtAt1/At	vt10    1/2
2,
which is independent of p and Eb.
I.F. Calibration of Other Parameters
The remaining parameters to specify are , , , and 
. The
values of  and  determine the mean and standard deviation of
the growth rate of output and consumption in no-disaster periods.
For annual U. S. data from 1890 to 2004,
19 the growth rate of real
consumer expenditure per person has a mean of 0.020 and a
standard deviation of 0.035. For real per capita GDP, the values
are 0.021 and 0.045. For 1954–2004, the means are similar, but
the standard deviations are smaller: the growth rate of real per
capita consumer expenditure has a mean of 0.024 and a standard
18. Equation (16) is valid if 1, which guarantees that expected utility is
ﬁnite (see Kocherlakota [1990]). When p  0, 1 corresponds to the
familiar transversality condition, 
  —the real interest rate exceeds the
growth rate. The condition 1 in the stochastic context corresponds to log
[Et(Rt1
e )]  log (EtAt1/At). From (17), the condition is (
1)(1/2)(

1)2
2  p  [E(1  b)
(1
)  1]  0.
19. National-accounts data since 1929 are from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Earlier data are from Kendrick [1961] and Romer [1988, 1989].
839 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETSdeviation of 0.017, whereas the values for per capita GDP are
0.021 and 0.022. To some extent, the higher volatility before
World War I may reﬂect poorer data (see Romer [1988, 1989]).
Table III shows statistics for growth rates of real per capita
GDP for the G7 countries for 1890–2004 and 1954–2004. Stan-
dard deviations for 1954–2004 are similar to that for the United
States, ranging between 0.02 and 0.03. Values for the longer
samples are higher, reﬂecting the events in Table I and probably
to a minor extent the lower quality of earlier data. Mean growth
rates of per capita GDP for 1954–2004 are 0.02–0.03, except for
Japan, which has 0.04. For 1890–2004, mean growth rates range
from 0.015 for the United Kingdom to 0.027 for Japan.
Table III also shows the sample kurtosis for growth rates.
For 1954–2004, the numbers are close to three, the value for a
normal density. Standard tests, such as Anderson-Darling, accept
the hypothesis of normality with p-values above 0.05. Hence, for
this tranquil period—in which the G7 countries avoided major
crises—the growth-rate data seem reasonably described as nor-
mal. The situation is different for 1890–2004, where the kurtosis
always exceeds ﬁve and reaches astronomical levels for Germany
and Japan.
20 These high values—indications of fat tails—reﬂect
20. In the model, the kurtosis can be expressed as a function of p, b, and .
The kurtosis equals 3 when p  0 but is very sensitive to p. For example, with a
ﬁxed value b  0.5, the kurtosis peaks at 156 when p  0.0016 and then falls to
74 when p  0.01 and 43 when p  0.02.
TABLE III
GROWTH RATES OF REAL PER CAPITA GDP IN G7 COUNTRIES
Growth rate of real per capita GDP, 1890–2004
Canada France Germany* Italy Japan U. K. U. S.
Mean 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.022 0.027 0.015 0.021
Standard deviation 0.051 0.069 0.090 0.059 0.082 0.030 0.045
Kurtosis 5.4 5.4 40.6 10.4 49.0 5.8 5.8
Growth rate of real per capita GDP, 1954–2004
Mean 0.022 0.026 0.027 0.030 0.043 0.021 0.021
Standard deviation 0.023 0.017 0.024 0.022 0.034 0.018 0.022
Kurtosis 3.4 2.5 3.9 2.8 2.4 3.1 2.6
* Data missing for Germany in 1918–1919.
Except for the United States, data are from Maddison [2003], updated through 2004 using information
from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Data. The U. S. sources are noted in the text.
840 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthe kinds of disasters shown in Table I, especially during World
War II. Standard tests, including Anderson-Darling, reject nor-
mality at low p-values. That is, normality does not accord
with samples such as 1890–2004 that include occurrences of
disasters.
21
Based on Table III for the 1954–2004 samples, I calibrate the
model with 0.025 and 0.02. The parameter  does not
affect the equity premium in (13) but does affect levels of rates of
return and the price-earnings ratio. The parameter  affects the
equity premium but is quantitatively unimportant in the relevant
range.
The rate of time preference, , does not affect the equity
premium in (13) but does affect levels of rates of return and the
price-earnings ratio. In the baseline speciﬁcation, I assume that
0.03 per year, a value often used in the saving literature, such
as Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes [1995].
The coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, 
, matters more for
the results. The usual view in the ﬁnance literature is that 
 is in
the range of something like 2 to 5. From the standpoint of inter-
temporal substitution of consumption, Barro and Sala-i-Martin
[2004, Ch. 2] argue that a similar range for 
 is needed to accord
with country-level observations on levels and transitional behav-
ior of saving rates.
22 If 
 is much below 2, saving rates fall
markedly as a country develops. If 
 is much above 4, levels of
saving rates are counterfactually low. In the calibrations, I use 

equal to 3 or 4.
II. REPLICATION OF MEHRA AND PRESCOTT
To see what the model is trying to ﬁt, Table IV shows average
real rates of return on stocks and bills for the G7 countries. Part
21. With respect to skewness, negative values apply to six of the seven
countries for 1890–2004. The magnitudes are particularly large for Germany and
Japan (5.2 and 5.6, respectively), and the skewness is positive only for France
(0.5, because of a dramatic rise in per capita GDP in 1946). For 1954–2004,
skewness is negative for four countries and positive for three countries.
22. In the present model, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, 
, equals the
reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption. My view
is that this restriction may be satisfactory for studying asset pricing and economic
growth. Kocherlakota [1990] uses the framework of Epstein and Zin [1989] to
explore an asset-pricing model in which the two forces can be distinguished.
841 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETS1 has long samples back as far as 1880,
23 and part 2 is for
1954–2004. For the long samples, the average real rate of return
on stocks is 0.071, whereas, for 1954–2004, the average is 0.087.
Average real bill returns are 0.001 for the long samples and
0.017 for 1954–2004. Thus, the average equity premium is
around 0.07 for both samples.
Table V, column (1), shows the model’s rates of return and
growth rates for the Mehra and Prescott [1985] case, where the
23. Germany has missing data for 1923–1924 and 1945. These lapses reﬂect
the German hyperinﬂation and World War II. For a discussion of sample-selection
problems in the context of stock returns, see Jorion and Goetzmann [1999].
TABLE IV
STOCK AND BILL RETURNS FOR G7 COUNTRIES
(AVERAGES OF ARITHMETIC ANNUAL RETURNS,S TANDARD DEVIATIONS
IN PARENTHESES)
Country & time period
Real stock
return
Real bill
return Spread
1. Long samples
Canada, 1934–2004 0.074 (0.160) 0.010 (0.036) 0.063 (0.163)
France, 1896–2004 0.070 (0.277) 0.018 (0.095) 0.088 (0.279)
Germany, 1880–2004* 0.052 (0.306) 0.009 (0.142) 0.061 (0.269)
Italy, 1925–2004 0.063 (0.296) 0.009 (0.128) 0.072 (0.283)
Japan, 1923–2004 0.092 (0.296) 0.012 (0.138) 0.104 (0.271)
U. K., 1880–2004 0.063 (0.183) 0.016 (0.055) 0.047 (0.179)
U. S., 1880–2004 0.081 (0.190) 0.015 (0.047) 0.066 (0.191)
Means 0.071 (0.240) 0.001 (0.092) 0.072 (0.234)
2. 1954–2004
Canada 0.074 (0.165) 0.024 (0.024) 0.050 (0.168)
France 0.091 (0.254) 0.019 (0.029) 0.072 (0.252)
Germany 0.098 (0.261) 0.018 (0.015) 0.080 (0.260)
Italy 0.067 (0.283) 0.016 (0.034) 0.051 (0.279)
Japan 0.095 (0.262) 0.012 (0.037) 0.083 (0.253)
U. K. 0.097 (0.242) 0.018 (0.033) 0.079 (0.250)
U. S. 0.089 (0.180) 0.014 (0.021) 0.076 (0.175)
Means 0.087 (0.235) 0.017 (0.028) 0.070 (0.234)
* Data missing for Germany in 1923–1924 and 1945.
Indexes of cumulated total nominal returns on stocks and government bills or analogous paper are from
Global Financial Data. See Taylor [2005] for a discussion. Nominal values for December of each year are
converted to real values by dividing by consumer price indexes. Annual real returns are computed arithmet-
ically based on December-to-December real values. CPI data since 1970 are available online from Bureau of
Labor Statistics and OECD. Earlier data are from Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Commerce
[1975], Mitchell [1980, 1982, 1983], and Mitchell and Deane [1962]. The German data for the CPI have breaks
corresponding to the hyperinﬂation in 1923–1924 and the separation into East and West in 1945. Therefore,
real returns are unavailable for these years. German data on dividends are missing for 1942–1952. Hence,
total stock returns for these years are understated.
842 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSdisaster probability p is nil. Equation (13) shows that the equity
premium is 

2 when p  0. Therefore, when 
4 and 0.02,
the premium is 0.0016, compared with the observed value of 0.07.
This spectacular failure has been often discussed in the asset-
pricing literature, summarized in Campbell [2000] and Mehra
and Prescott [2003]. The main source of difﬁculty is that the
model’s real bill rate is way too high. When 
4 and 0.02,
(11) implies a real bill rate of 0.127, far above observed values of
less than 0.02 in Table IV.
The model cannot be ﬁxed by reasonable modiﬁcations of the
parameters 
 and . To get an equity premium of 0.07 when 

4,  has to be 0.13, way above observed standard deviations for
annual growth rates of real per capita GDP and consumer expen-
diture. If 0.02, 
 has to be 175 to get a spread of 0.07.
However, a large 
 does not accord with observed real bill rates.
If 

2  0.07, to get a real bill rate around 0.02 in (11) when p 
0, 
 has to be close to 1. Then, to get the right equity premium, 
has to be around 0.26, even further above observed values.
III. LEVERAGE
The results can change when equity shares represent a claim
on only a part of GDP and consumption. The equity premium is
higher than in the baseline model if the ratio of equity payments
to consumption is procyclical, in particular, low in the wake of a
disaster. This pattern arises, for example, with leverage—when
the ownership structure for trees includes ﬁxed claims (bonds) as
well as equities.
I consider again one-period claims, which apply to next peri-
od’s dividend At1. Suppose that the capital structure includes
equity and one-period private bonds. These bonds are identical to
government bills—they promise the gross face return Rt1
f , but
partial default in the proportion d occurs with probability q when
a disaster occurs. This speciﬁcation is reasonable if private bonds
are nominally denominated, like most government bills, and if
partial default occurs through inﬂation. I assume that default on
private bonds does not occur in the absence of a disaster.
I use the following structure to analyze leverage. At the start
of period t, a tree owner issues a one-period claim on At1 that
sells at the (equilibrium) price Pt1. Then the owner issues t units
of one-period private bonds and gives the proceeds to the equity
843 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETSholder.
24 Thus, the net price paid for levered equity is Pt1  t.
In period t  1, output is At1, and the contractual payment to
bondholders is t  Rt1
f . The proportion d of the bond payment is
withheld with probability q if a disaster occurs. The rest of the
output goes to the equity holder. I make an assumption so that, as
the length of the period shrinks to zero, output is sufﬁcient to
cover the debt obligation with probability one.
In accordance with Modigliani-Miller, leverage does not af-
fect the overall market value of claims on next period’s output,
which is still given by the expression for Pt1 in (8). However, the
debt issue t affects the expected rate of return on levered equity,
which is valued at Pt1  t. An expression for the expected rate
of return on levered equity can be derived from the pricing for-
mula in (4).
The debt-equity ratio  is given as the length of the period
approaches zero by
(20)   t/At  t.
I treat  as a constant, constrained to satisfy a condition that
rules out bankruptcy:
(21)   1  bmax/bmax,
where bmax is the largest possible value of b. When this condition
holds, the expected rate of return on levered equity turns out to be
(22) log EtRt1
e 	    
  1/2

2
2  1  
 

2  p  E1  b
1
  1  Eb	  p
 1  q  Eb  1  q  E1  b

  q  E1  b
1
	.
This formula generalizes (9) to allow for 0. The levered equity
premium is the difference between (22) and the expected bill rate
in (12). The result is that the levered equity premium is the
multiple 1 of the unlevered premium in (13):
(23) levered equity premium  1  
 

2  p  1  q  E1  b
  E1  b
1
  Eb	.
24. Analogously, a two-period equity claim, applying to At2, could be paired
with a two-period bond, which pays off at t  2. An equity claim on the tree would
be matched with a complete term structure of bonds. With the i.i.d. assumptions
that I make, these longer term levered claims would have the same properties as
the one-period claim that I analyze.
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recent debt-equity ratios for the U. S. nonﬁnancial corporate
sector are around 0.5. If 0.5, leverage does not affect the main
conclusions about the equity premium in the model without di-
sasters, p  0. If the unlevered spread is trivial—less than
0.002—multiplying by 1.5 (when 0.5) still generates a trivial
number. However, when p  0, the value of  signiﬁcantly affects
the quantitative results.
The effective leverage coefﬁcient,  in (23), would exceed the
debt-equity ratio if there were other reasons for a procyclical
pattern of the ratio of equity payments to consumption. One
possible source of this pattern is that the ratio of labor income to
GDP is countercyclical. Another possibility is that the ratio of
consumption to GDP is countercyclical (because the ratio of in-
vestment to GDP is procyclical). At present, I do not analyze these
mechanisms. However, to get an idea of the potential effects, it
may be reasonable to consider values of  that exceed observed
debt-ratios of around 0.5.
IV. RARE DISASTERS AND THE EQUITY PREMIUM
I now allow for the disaster probability, p  0. Results from
calibrations of the model are in Table V. I use the parameter
values discussed before along with the empirical frequency dis-
tribution for disaster sizes, b, shown in Figure I, panel A.
The potential for disasters affects the variance of the growth
rate, At1/At. As the length of the period approaches zero, this
variance can be determined from (7) as
(24) VAR At1/At  
2  p  Eb
2.
The distribution of disaster sizes in Figure I, panel A, implies
E(b
2)  0.10. Using the trend-adjusted values in panel B leads
to the higher value 0.14. Using 0.02 and p  0.017, the
standard deviation of the growth rate in (24) is 0.046 per year
with the raw numbers for b and 0.053 for the trend-adjusted
numbers. These values are somewhat below the average of 0.061
for the standard deviation of the growth rates of real per capita
GDP for the G7 countries for 1890–2004 (Table III). These long
samples can be viewed as containing the representative number
of v-type disasters.
Table V, column (2), which assumes that 
4, shows that an
allowance for rare disasters can generate reasonable equity pre-
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CALIBRATED MODEL FOR RATES OF RETURN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Parameters
No
disasters Baseline
Low


High
p
Low
q
Low

Low


 (coeff. of relative risk
aversion) 4 43 4444
 (s.d. of growth rate, no
disasters) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
 (rate of time
preference) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
 (growth rate,
deterministic part) 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.020 0.025
p (disaster probability) 0 0.017 0.017 0.025 0.017 0.017 0.017
q (bill default probability
in disaster) 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Variables
Expected equity rate 0.128 0.071 0.076 0.044 0.071 0.051 0.061
Expected bill rate 0.127 0.035 0.0610.007 0.029 0.015 0.025
Equity premium 0.0016 0.036 0.016 0.052 0.042 0.036 0.036
Expected equity rate,
conditional 0.128 0.076 0.081 0.052 0.076 0.056 0.066
Face bill rate 0.127 0.037 0.0630.004 0.031 0.017 0.027
Equity premium,
conditional 0.0016 0.039 0.019 0.056 0.045 0.039 0.039
Price-earnings ratio 9.7 19.6 17.8 37.0 19.6 27.8 24.4
Expected growth rate 0.025 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.015 0.020
Expected growth rate,
conditional 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.020 0.025
Levered results (debt-equity ratio is 0.5)
Expected equity rate 0.129 0.089 0.084 0.071 0.092 0.069 0.079
Equity premium 0.0024 0.054 0.024 0.078 0.063 0.059 0.054
Expected equity rate,
conditional 0.129 0.096 0.091 0.080 0.099 0.076 0.086
Equity premium,
conditional 0.0024 0.059 0.028 0.084 0.068 0.059 0.059
Cells show the calibrated model’s rates of return and growth rates, based on the indicated parameter
values. The distribution of disaster sizes b comes from Table I (Figure I, panel A). The expected rate of return
on equity is in (9). The expected rate of return on bills is in (12). The equity premium is the difference between
these two rates. The expected rate of return on equity conditioned on no disasters is in (10). The face bill rate
is in (11). The equity premium conditioned on no disasters is the difference between these two rates. The
price-earnings ratio is in (17). The expected growth rate is in (18), and the expected growth rate conditioned
on no disasters is in (19). The levered expected rate of return on equity is in (22), and the levered equity
premium is in (23). Conditioning on no disasters raises the levered expected return on equity by p  Eb  (1 
q) and the levered equity premium by (1  )  p  (1  q)  Eb.
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umn (1)) to 0.017 is that the expected real bill rate falls dramat-
ically—from 0.127 to 0.035. The inverse relation between p and
log [Et(Rt1
b )] applies generally in (12); when 
4, the coefﬁcient
on p is 5.3.
Less intuitively, a rise in p also lowers the expected rate of
return on equity, log [Et(Rt1
e )], given in (9). If 
1, this change
partly reﬂects an increase in the P-E ratio in (17)—when p 
0.017, the ratio of 19.6 in Table V, column (2), exceeds the value
9.7 for p  0 in column (1).
25 Intuitively, a rise in p motivates a
shift toward the risk-free asset and away from the risky one—this
force would lower the P-E ratio. However, households also want
to hold more assets overall because of greater uncertainty about
the future. If 
1, this second force dominates, leading to a net
increase in the P-E ratio. Even if 
1, the negative effect of p on
log [Et(Rt1
e )] applies in (9). The reason is that a rise in p lowers
the expected growth rate of dividends, Et(At1/At), and this force
makes the overall effect negative if 
0. In any event, the
expected rate of return on equity falls by less than the expected
bill rate, so that the equity premium increases in (13).
With no leverage, the equity premium in Table V, column (2),
is 0.036.
26 With a debt-equity ratio of 0.5, the premium is
multiplied by 1.5 to get 0.054. Hence, if 
4, the levered equity
premium in the calibrated model is in the neighborhood of the
empirical observations in Table IV.
As mentioned before, consideration of labor income and of a
variable ratio of consumption to GDP might raise the effective
leverage coefﬁcient, . With 1, the levered equity premium in
the baseline speciﬁcation is 0.072, close to observed values.
The results are sensitive to the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion, 
. Table V, column (3), assumes that 
3. In this case,
the levered equity premium is only 0.024, and the expected bill
rate is unrealistically high—0.061.
The results also depend on the disaster probability p. Since
25. If 
1, an increase in p raises the P-E ratio if vt is a global shock, such
as a world war or global depression. This result also applies to a shock for a single
country if the country is isolated from the rest of the world. However, if a country
is integrated into world asset markets, an increase in the country-speciﬁc proba-
bility pi of a disaster lowers the P-E ratio for equity claims on country i’s product
(for any 
).
26. If I include the 21 additional contractions in the interval between 0.10
and 0.14 (see note 9), the expected equity rate falls to 0.068, the expected bill rate
falls to 0.032, and the equity premium is still 0.036 (higher by 0.0003 than in the
setting without the 21 events).
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2 is small, the equity premium is nearly proportional
to p in (13); when 
4, the coefﬁcient on p is 2.0. With a leverage
ratio of 0.5, this coefﬁcient is multiplied by 1.5 to get 3.0.
Thus, comparing columns (2) and (4) of Table V, an increase in p
from 0.017 to 0.025 raises the levered equity premium from 0.054
to 0.078.
For a given disaster probability p and distribution of disaster
sizes b, a decrease in the contingent probability of default, q,
raises the equity premium.
27 That is, a lower q means that bills
tend to do better relative to stocks during disasters—hence, the
equity premium increases. A comparison of columns (2) and (5) of
Table V shows that a decrease in q from 0.4 to 0.3 raises the
levered equity premium from 0.054 to 0.063.
Columns (6) and (7) of Table V consider changes in the
growth rate, , and the rate of time preference, . These parame-
ters do not affect the equity premium but do affect levels of rates
of return and the price-earnings ratio.
The results depend a lot on how bad disasters are, as gauged
by the distribution of b. The results in Table V use the empirical
distribution for disaster sizes in Figure I, panel A, for which the
mean of b is 0.29. However, the various asset returns are nonlin-
ear in b, for example, the equity premium in (13) depends on the
terms E(1  b)

 and E(1  b)
1
. This dependence means that,
for given 
, the effective weighted average of the b’s for determin-
ing the equity premium gives more weight to the larger contrac-
tions. Moreover, for a given distribution of disaster sizes, the
effective weighted average of the b’s is larger the higher is 
.
Figure II brings out the role of the b variable by comparing
three scenarios. The middle curve corresponds to the historical
frequency of disaster sizes (Figure I, panel A) and, therefore, to
Table V. The lower curve applies when b is constant at the high
value 0.5, and the upper curve when b is constant at the low value
0.25. Each curve shows the combinations of the coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion (
) and probability of disaster (p) needed to
generate a levered equity premium equal to the historical value of
0.07.
28 Each curve assumes that the other parameters are set at
27. A lower default size, d, would have the same effect—the product qd
matters for pricing.
28. The transversality condition given in note 18 does not hold for high
enough 
. Violations occur for the historical distribution of b when 
5.16, for
b  0.5 when 
3.73, and for b  0.25 when 
10.55. However, it is always
possible to satisfy the transversality condition by choosing a high enough . Since
848 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthe baseline values from Table V, column (2)—in particular, the
debt-equity ratio is 0.5, the contingent probability of default
is q  0.4, and the size of default is d  b.
When 
2, the position of the middle curve in Figure II
signiﬁes that the effective weighted average of the observed fre-
quency distribution of the b’s (which have a mean of 0.29) is
between 0.25 and 0.50 but closer to the lower curve, which cor-
 does not affect the equity premium, the curves shown in Figure II still apply
with this adjustment to .
FIGURE II
Isopremium Curves
The graphs show the combinations of the disaster probability (p) and the
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion (
) needed to generate a levered equity pre-
mium of 0.07 in (23) with a leverage coefﬁcient, , of 0.5. The middle graph uses
the historical frequency of disaster sizes b, given in Figure I, panel A. In the
lowest graph, b is constant at 0.5, and in the upper graph, b is constant at 0.25.
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 rises, the effective weighted average of
the observed b’s increases—therefore, the middle curve gets even
closer to the lower curve.
One way to use Figure II is to calculate the value of 
 needed
to generate a levered equity premium of 0.07 when the disaster
probability is set at its baseline value of p  0.017. The answer
is 
4.3 for the historical distribution (middle curve), 
3.3
when b  0.5, and 
10.0 when b  0.25.
Another way to use Figure II is to compute the values of p
required to generate a levered equity premium of 0.07 when 
 is
ﬁxed, say at 4. For the historical distribution of b, the required
value of p is 0.022. In contrast, when b  0.5, the required value
of p is 0.010, and when b  0.25, the required value is 0.139.
Campbell [2000] observes that Rietz’s low-probability disas-
ters create a “peso problem” when disasters are not observed
within sample. Indeed, data availability tends to select no-disas-
ter samples, as observed by Jorion and Goetzmann [1999]. How-
ever, this consideration turns out not to be quantitatively so
important in the model.
Conditioning on no-disaster samples raises the expected rate
of return on equity by p  Eb, as shown by a comparison of (9) with
(10). With leverage, conditioning on no disasters eliminates the
terms involving Eb in (22). Therefore, the expected rate of return
on levered equity rises by p  Eb  (1 q). With the
parameters used in columns (2) and (3) of Table V (p  0.017,
Eb  0.29, and 0.5), this expression equals 0.0063. There-
fore, the levered expected returns on equity conditioned on no
disasters are higher by this amount than the full-sample returns.
Because of the default possibility on bills, conditioning on no
disasters raises the expected rate of return on bills by pq 
Eb—see (11) and (12). With the parameters in columns (2) and (3)
of Table V, this term equals 0.002. Therefore, the face bill returns
exceed the expected bill rates by this amount.
On net, conditioning on no disasters raises the levered equity
premium by the expression (1  )  p  (1  q)  Eb. This term
equals 0.004 with the parameters (0.5, p  0.017, q  0.4,
and Eb  0.29) in columns (2) and (3) of Table V. Therefore, the
equity premiums conditioned on no disasters are higher by this
amount than the full-sample premiums.
Finally, conditioning on no disasters raises the expected
growth rate by the term p  Eb in (18). With the parameters in
columns (2) and (3) of Table V, this term is 0.005. Therefore, the
850 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSgrowth rates conditioned on no disasters are higher by this
amount.
The point is that the selection of no-disaster samples—a
selection often driven by data availability—has only moderate
effects on average rates of return on equity and bills, the equity
premium, and economic growth rates. Nevertheless, the potential
for these disasters has major effects on rates of return and the
equity premium.
V. DURATION OF DISASTERS
In the model, disasters last for an instant of time, but in the
data economic crises persist for varying numbers of years (Table
I). In using the data to assess the distribution of disaster sizes, b,
I used the cumulative falls in real per capita GDP during the
crises (Figure I, panel A). A better procedure would allow for two
regimes—normal and crisis—with transition probabilities be-
tween the two. The probability p governs shifts from normal to
crisis periods. Another probability could govern transitions from
crisis to normal (and thereby determine the frequency distribu-
tion for lengths of wars and ﬁnancial crises). During a crisis,
output might fall steadily or, at least, the probability of substan-
tial decline is much greater than at normal times.
This extension requires a deviation from one of the core
simplifying assumptions of the analysis, i.i.d. shocks. This as-
sumption, along with the existence of a representative agent,
generates simple, closed-form results that explain a lot about
asset returns. Moreover, this setup admits a number of rich
complications, including a distribution of disaster sizes, default
probability on bills, and leverage. Because of these beneﬁts, I am
reluctant to abandon the i.i.d. assumption, at least in the present
analysis. However, a discrete-period version of the i.i.d. model
may give some idea of the likely consequences from allowing for a
full treatment of disaster regimes.
My initial setup used discrete periods but then allowed the
arbitrary period length to approach zero. Now I reintroduce dis-
crete periods and denote the length by T. The parameter T
represents, among other things, the ﬁxed length of disasters.
Thus, differences in T indicate how the results depend on the
average duration of disasters.
Application of the pricing formula from (4) leads to equations
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periods of length T:
(25) 
1
T  log EtRtT
r 	    
  1/2

2
2  

2

1
T  log
e
pT  (1  e
pT)  (1  Eb)
e
pT  (1  e
pT)  E(1  b)
1

(26) 
1
T  log EtRtT
b 	    


1
2

2
2  

2 
1
T  log e
pT  1  e
pT
 1  q  E1  b

  q  E1  b
1
  q  Eb	.
These formulas reduce to (9) and (12), respectively, as T ap-
proaches zero.
The allowance for persisting crises suggests reconsideration
of the measured disaster sizes, b. Since crises last for a ﬁnite
interval, the raw numbers (Figure I, panel A) do not accurately
measure the proportionate effect on output due to the crisis. The
observed declines in real per capita GDP over intervals of varying
lengths (Table I) should be adjusted to allow for normal growth
over the crisis periods. This adjustment—using the parameter
values 0.025 and 0.02 and the number of years applicable
to each crisis—results in the distribution of disaster sizes shown
in Figure I, panel B. This adjustment is substantial—the mean of
b rises from 0.29 to 0.35.
Table VI shows the model’s expected rates of return on equity
and bills and the equity premium for different settings of the
period length, T. The upper part of the table assumes that 
4,
and the lower part uses 
3. The other parameters are the
baseline values from Table V, column (2). The ﬁrst row of each
panel in Table VI assumes that T  0 and makes no trend
adjustment to the b values. These results correspond to Table V,
columns (2) and (3). The second row of each panel in Table VI
maintains T  0 but adjusts the disaster sizes for trend (using a
different number of years for each crisis in Table I). This upward
adjustment to b substantially affects the expected rates of return
and the equity premium. When 
4, the unlevered equity
premium is now 0.064, rather than 0.036, and the expected bill
rate is 0.020, rather than 0.035.
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reverses the effects from the trend adjustments to the b values.
The reason is that, at the beginning of any period, the uncertain
future is more distant when T is larger. Table VI shows that, for
T between three and ﬁve years, the equity premium is somewhat
higher and the expected bill rate somewhat lower than the values
in the original model (Table V, columns (2) and (3)).
In the T-period model, the rates of return refer to periods of
length T. Therefore, in matching the data with the model, it
would be reasonable to calculate equity premiums by comparing
equity returns with returns on longer term bonds, rather than
short-term bills. In practice, this change does not substantially
alter the empirical picture. For 1880 to 2004, using data from
Global Financial Data, the average real rate of return on ten-year
maturity U. S. government bonds was 2.3 percent, compared with
1.5 percent for bills. From 1919 to 2004, the average real rate of
return on ﬁve-year maturity U. S. government bonds was 2.4
percent, compared with 2.7 percent on ten-year bonds and 1.0
percent on bills. Thus, instead of 7 percent, the U. S. equity
premium calculated from longer term bonds is around 6 percent.
My inference from Table VI is that the main results would
not change greatly by extending the model to allow for crises of
TABLE VI
EFFECT OF PERIOD LENGTH ON EQUITY AND BILL RATES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b detrended?
Period length
T (years)
Expected equity
rate (unlevered)
Expected
bill rate
Equity premium
(unlevered)

4
No 0 0.071 0.035 0.036
Yes 0 0.044 0.020 0.064
Yes 3 0.054 0.008 0.046
Yes 5 0.059 0.020 0.038

3
No 0 0.076 0.061 0.016
Yes 0 0.066 0.041 0.025
Yes 3 0.068 0.047 0.021
Yes 5 0.070 0.051 0.019
The cells show the expected equity and bill rates and the equity premium in the discrete-period model
with period length T. Column (1) indicates whether the distribution of disaster sizes b is computed from raw
data (Figure I, panel A) or trend-adjusted values (Figure I, panel B). The expected equity rate in column (3)
comes from (25). The expected bill rate in column (4) comes from (26). The equity premium in column (5) is
the difference between these two rates.
853 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETSﬁnite and varying lengths. However, a worthwhile extension
would deal more seriously with the dynamics of crisis regimes.
VI. RARE DISASTERS AND THE BILL RATE
The results in Table V apply when p and q and the other
parameters are ﬁxed; for example, p  0.017 per year, and q 
0.4. The results also show the effects from permanent, unantici-
pated changes in any of the parameters, such as p and q. I now
use the model to assess the effects from changes in p and q.
However, in a full analysis, stochastic variations in p and q would
be part of the model.
An increase in p reduces the expected bill rate in (12) and the
face bill rate in (11). With the parameters in Table V, column (2),
including 
4, the coefﬁcient on p in (12) is 5.3. Therefore, if
p rises permanently from 0.017 to 0.025, the expected bill rate
falls from 0.035 (column (2)) to 0.007 (column (4)). Mehra and
Prescott [1988, p. 135] criticized the analogous prediction from
Rietz’s [1988] analysis:
Perhaps the implication of the Rietz theory that the real interest rate and the
probability of the extreme event move inversely would be useful in rational-
izing movements in the real interest rate during the last 100 years. For
example, the perceived probability of a recurrence of a depression was prob-
ably high just after World War II and then declined. If real interest rates rose
signiﬁcantly as the war years receded, that would support the Rietz hypothe-
sis. But they did not....Similarly, if the low-probability event precipitating
the large decline in consumption were a nuclear war, the perceived proba-
bility of such an event surely has varied in the last 100 years. It must have
been low before 1945, the ﬁrst and only year the atom bomb was used. And
it must have been higher before the Cuban Missile Crisis than after it. If real
interest rates moved as predicted, that would support Rietz’s disaster sce-
nario. But again, they did not.
The general point about the probability of depression makes
sense, but I am skeptical that the end of World War II raised this
probability. I consider later the likely movements in disaster
probability associated with the Great Depression itself.
The observations about the probability of nuclear war con-
fuse, in my terminology, the disaster probability, p, and the
conditional expected probability of default, q. A heightened
chance of nuclear war likely raises p but also substantially in-
creases q—because defaults on bills would be highly probable in
the wake of a nuclear conﬂict, especially if it led to the end of the
854 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSworld!
29 Although an increase in p lowers the expected bill rate in
(12), a rise in q has the opposite effect. Thus, for an event such as
the Cuban missile crisis, the predicted effect on the expected bill
rate is ambiguous.
Changing probabilities of depression would likely isolate the
effect of changing p, because defaults on bills are atypical in these
situations. However, we have to identify the variations in depres-
sion probability that occurred over time or across countries. From
a U. S. perspective, the onset of the Great Depression in the early
1930s likely raised p (for the future). The recovery from 1934 to
1937 probably reduced p, but the recurrence of sharp economic
contraction in 1937–1938 likely increased p again. Less clear is
how the end of World War II affected p.
The events shown in Table I suggest consideration of chang-
ing probability of the types of wars seen in history—notably
World Wars I and II, which were massive but not the end of the
world in the manner that might be implied by a nuclear conﬂict.
My assumption is that the occurrence of this type of war raised p
and q, that is, increased the perceived probabilities of future
disasters and of future defaults on bills. Starting from the base-
line values p  0.017 and q  0.4, using the historical distri-
bution of the b’s in Figure I, panel A, and assuming that 
4,
increases in p and q imply a net reduction in the expected bill rate
if the following inequality holds:
(27) p/p  0.25  q/q.
For example, if a war raises p by 0.001 (from 0.017 to 0.018), this
inequality would be violated only if q rises by at least 0.09 (from
0.40 to 0.49). I assume that this inequality holds during the U. S.
wars. In that case, the model predicts that the occurrence of war
reduces the expected bill rate in (12) and the face bill rate in (11).
Figure III shows an estimated time series since 1859 of the
expected real interest rate on U. S. Treasury Bills or analogous
29. The chance of loss of property rights on equity claims—assumed to be
zero in my analysis—would also be signiﬁcant here. I considered using the famous
“doomsday clock,” discussed by Slemrod [1986], to assess empirically the changing
probability of nuclear war. The clock is available online from the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists. I decided not to use these “data” because the settings reﬂect an
ideology that always identiﬁes toughness with higher probability of nuclear war
and disarmament with lower probability. For example, the clock was nearly at its
worst point—three minutes to midnight—in 1984 shortly after President Reagan
began his successful confrontation of the “evil empire” of the Soviet Union.
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30 To compute the expected real interest rate, I
subtracted an estimate of the expected inﬂation rate for the CPI.
Since 1947, my measure of expected inﬂation is based on the
Livingston Survey. From 1859 to 1946, I measured the “expected
inﬂation rate” as the ﬁtted value from an autoregression of an-
nual CPI inﬂation on a single lag.
31 Additional lags lack explana-
30. The source of data on nominal returns is Global Financial Data, the same
as in Table IV. Before the introduction of T-Bills in 1922, the data refer to
high-grade commercial paper. It would be preferable to look at returns on indexed
bonds, but these instruments exist in the United States only since 1997.
31. The inﬂation rate is the January-to-January value from 1913 to 1946.
Before 1913, the CPI data are something like annual averages. The estimated lag
coefﬁcient is 0.62 (s.e.  0.09). The R
2 for this regression is 0.35.
FIGURE III
Expected Real Interest Rate on U. S. T-Bills/Commercial Paper, 1859–2004
Data on nominal returns on U. S. Treasury Bills (1922–2004) and Commercial
Paper (1859–1921) are from Global Financial Data. See the notes to Table IV.
From 1947–2004, expected real returns are nominal returns less the Livingston
expected inﬂation rate for the CPI (using six-month-ahead forecasts from June
and December). For 1859–1946 the expected real return is the nominal return less
a constructed estimate of expected inﬂation derived from a ﬁrst-order autoregres-
sion of CPI inﬂation rates for 1859–1946. The CPI data are from Bureau of Labor
Statistics (January values since 1913, annual averages before 1913) and U. S.
Department of Commerce [1975].
856 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICStory power, although there may be a long-run tendency over this
period for the price level to adjust toward a stationary target.
One striking observation from Figure III is that the expected
real interest rate tended to be low during wars—especially the
Civil War, World War I, and World War II. The main exception is
the Vietnam War.
32 Table VII shows the nominal interest rate,
expected inﬂation rate, and expected real interest rate during
each war and the Great Depression. The typical wartime pat-
tern—applicable to the Civil War, World Wars I and II, and the
ﬁrst part of the Korean War—is that the nominal interest rate
changed little, while actual and expected inﬂation rates rose.
Therefore, expected real interest rates declined, often becoming
negative. Moreover, the price controls imposed during World War
II and the Korean War likely led to an understatement of inﬂa-
tion; therefore, the expected real interest rate probably declined
even more than shown for these cases.
Figure III and Table VII show that expected real interest
rates fell in 2001–2003 during the most recent war—a combina-
tion of the September 11 attacks and the conﬂicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq. This period also has data on real yields on U. S.
Treasury indexed bonds, ﬁrst issued in 1997. The ten-year real
rate fell from an average of 3.8 percent for 1/97–8/01 to 2.2
percent for 10/01–8/05.
33 Similarly, the ﬁve-year real rate de-
clined from an average of 3.2 percent for 12/00–8/01 to 1.6 per-
cent for 10/01–8/05. These real rate reductions on indexed bonds
accord with those shown for the short-term “expected real rate” in
Table VII.
34
The tendency for expected real interest rates to be low during
U. S. wars has been a mystery, described in Barro [1997, Ch.
32. Taxation of nominal interest income along with an increase in the ex-
pected inﬂation rate may explain the Vietnam pattern. That is, expected after-tax
real interest rates were low.
33. The indexed bonds data show that risk-free real interest rates are not
close to constant. For ten-year U. S. indexed bonds, the mean for 1/97–8/05 was
3.0 percent, with a standard deviation of 0.9 percent and a range from 1.5 percent
to 4.3 percent. For the United Kingdom from 2/83–8/05, the mean real rate on
ten-year indexed bonds was 3.2 percent, with a standard deviation of 0.8 percent
and a range from 1.5 percent to 4.6 percent.
34. The real rate on ten-year indexed bonds peaked at 4.2 percent in May
2000 then fell to 3.3 percent in August 2001—perhaps because of the end of the
Internet boom in the stock market but obviously not because of September 11 or
the Afghanistan-Iraq wars. However, the rate then fell to 3.0 percent in October
2001 and, subsequently, to 1.8 percent in February 2003. The lowest level was 1.5
percent in March 2004.
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INTEREST AND INFLATION RATES DURING WARS AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION
IN THE UNITED STATES
Year
Nominal
return
Expected
inﬂation rate
Expected real
return
Civil War
1860 0.070 0.006 0.063
1861 (start of war) 0.066 0.026 0.039
1862 0.058 0.063 0.005
1863 0.051 0.082 0.031
1864 0.062 0.128 0.066
1865 (end of war) 0.079 0.050 0.029
Spanish-American War
1897 0.018 0.015 0.004
1898 (year of war) 0.021 0.006 0.015
World War I
1914 (start of war) 0.047 0.021 0.026
1915 0.033 0.011 0.022
1916 0.033 0.026 0.007
1917 (U. S. entrance) 0.048 0.075 0.028
1918 (end of war) 0.059 0.116 0.057
Great Depression
1929 0.045 0.000 0.044
1930 (start of depression) 0.023 0.006 0.016
1931 0.012 0.038 0.050
1932 0.009 0.059 0.068
1933 (worst of depression) 0.005 0.057 0.062
1934 0.003 0.022 0.020
1935 0.002 0.025 0.023
1936 0.002 0.015 0.014
1937 (onset of sharp recession) 0.003 0.018 0.016
1938 0.001 0.012 0.012
World War II
1939 (start of war) 0.000 0.005 0.006
1940 0.000 0.005 0.005
1941 (U. S. entrance) 0.001 0.014 0.012
1942 0.003 0.072 0.068
1943 0.004 0.053 0.049
1944 0.004 0.024 0.021
1945 (end of war) 0.004 0.021 0.017
Korean War
1950 (start of war) 0.012 0.014 0.002
1951 0.016 0.026 0.010
1952 0.017 0.005 0.012
1953 (end of war) 0.019 0.009 0.028
Vietnam War
1964 0.036 0.011 0.025
1965 (start of main war) 0.041 0.012 0.029
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35 Most macroeconomic models predict that a massive, tem-
porary expansion of government purchases would raise expected
real interest rates. In previous work, I conjectured that military
conscription and mandated production might explain part of the
puzzle. Mulligan [1997] attempted to explain the World War II
data by invoking a large increase of labor supply due to patriot-
ism. A complementary idea is that patriotism and rationing mo-
tivated increases in saving, perhaps concentrated on war bonds.
However, the low real interest rate in wartime seems too perva-
sive to be explained by these special factors. The rare-disasters
framework offers a more promising explanation: expected real
interest rates tend to fall in wartime because of increases in the
perceived probability, p, of future economic disaster.
Table VII also shows U. S. expected real interest rates during
35. Barro [1987] ﬁnds that interest rates were high during U. K. wars from
1701 to 1918. However, this evidence pertains to nominal, long-term rates. Short-
term interest rates are unavailable for the long U. K. history, but realized
short-term real rates were low during World Wars I and II.
TABLE VII
(CONTINUED)
Year
Nominal
return
Expected
inﬂation rate
Expected real
return
1966 0.049 0.018 0.031
1967 0.044 0.022 0.022
1968 0.055 0.029 0.026
1969 0.069 0.032 0.037
1970 0.065 0.036 0.029
1971 0.044 0.035 0.008
1972 (end of main war) 0.042 0.033 0.009
Gulf War
1990 0.077 0.039 0.038
1991 (year of war) 0.054 0.035 0.020
1992 0.035 0.034 0.001
Afghanistan-Iraq War
2000 0.058 0.025 0.033
2001 (September 11) 0.033 0.025 0.008
2002 (start of Afghanistan war) 0.016 0.022 0.006
2003 (start of Iraq war) 0.010 0.017 0.006
2004 0.014 0.018 0.004
Nominal returns on U. S. Treasury Bills or commercial paper (before 1922) are calculated as in Table IV.
The expected inﬂation rate for the CPI is constructed as described in the notes to Figure III. The expected real
return is the difference between the nominal return and the expected inﬂation rate.
859 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETSthe Great Depression. According to the theory, this rate should
have declined if the probability p of disaster increased. Matching
this prediction to the data is difﬁcult because of uncertainty about
how to gauge expected inﬂation during a time of substantial
deﬂation.
The nominal return on Treasury Bills fell from over 4 percent
in 1929 to 2 percent in 1930, 1 percent in 1931, and less than 1
percent from 1932 on. However, the inﬂation rate became sub-
stantially negative (2 percent in 1930, 9 percent in 1931, 11
percent in 1932, 5 percent in 1933), and the constructed ex-
pected inﬂation rate also became negative: 4 percent in 1931
and 6 percent in 1932 and 1933. Therefore, the measured ex-
pected real interest rate was high for 1931–1933. However, this
construction is likely to be erroneous because the deﬂation in
1931–1933 depended on a series of monetary/ﬁnancial shocks,
each of which was unpredictable from year to year. Hence, ratio-
nal agents likely did not anticipate much of this deﬂation. This
perspective accords with Hamilton’s [1992] observation that fu-
tures prices on several commodities remained well above spot
prices during the early 1930s. Hence, I think that expected real
interest rates were much lower in the early 1930s than the values
reported in the table. From 1934 on, the inﬂation rate became
positive. The combination of positive expected inﬂation with
nominal interest rates close to zero generated low expected real
interest rates for 1934–1938. This period includes the sharp
recession—and possible fears of a return to depression—in
1937–1938.
VII. VOLATILITY OF STOCK RETURNS
The variance of the growth rate of At is given in (24). In the
baseline model in Table V, column (2), the price-earnings ratio is
constant. Therefore, the standard deviation of stock returns
equals the standard deviation of the growth rate of At. When p 
0.017, this standard deviation equals 0.046 or 0.053 when disas-
ter sizes b have the distribution given by Figure I, panel A or B,
respectively. These values apply to samples with representative
numbers of disasters, such as the long periods considered in the
upper part of Table III. However, the average standard deviation
of stock returns over these periods was 0.23 (Table IV), way above
the value predicted by the model. Similarly, the tranquil period
1954–2004 displayed in the lower part of Table III should corre-
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model standard deviation of stock returns is 0.02 (the value for 
in the baseline speciﬁcation), whereas the average standard de-
viation in the data was again 0.23 (Table IV). These discrepancies
correspond to the excess-volatility puzzle for stock returns.
A natural way to resolve this puzzle is to allow for variation
in underlying parameters, notably the probability p of v-type
disaster. Table V shows that the price-earnings ratio is sensitive
to p. Comparing columns (2) and (4), an increase in p from 0.017
to 0.025 raises the P-E ratio from 19.6 to 37.0. As already noted,
this change refers to a permanent shift in disaster probability.
However, an extension of the model to allow for stochastic, per-
sisting variations in pt may account for the observed volatility of
stock returns.
To get an idea of the magnitudes, the annual standard devia-
tion of the residuals from an AR(1) process for the log of the U. S.
P-E ratio is around 0.2 for December values from 1880 to 2004. If

4 and b has the frequency distribution given in Figure I, panel
A, the coefﬁcient on p in the denominator of the formula for the
P-E ratio in (17) equals 3.0. This coefﬁcient implies that the
effect of a change in p on the proportionate change in the P-E
ratio is 59 in the neighborhood of the baseline values used in
Table V, column (2). Therefore, to generate an annual standard
deviation for the log of the P-E ratio of 0.2, the annual standard
deviation of p has to be around 0.0034.
An important question is whether this variability in p gen-
erates unrealistically large ﬂuctuations in the expected bill rate,
given in (12). The coefﬁcient on p in (12) with the baseline pa-
rameters is 5.4. Therefore, an annual standard deviation for p
of 0.0034 generates a standard deviation of the expected real bill
rate of 0.018. The annual standard deviation of the residuals from
an AR(1) process for December values of realized real rates of
return on U. S. Treasury Bills or short-term commercial paper
from 1880 to 2004 is 0.018, equal to the predicted value. There-
fore, the model does not seem to generate excessive volatility in
real interest rates.
Another way to look at the results is in terms of the Sharpe
ratio for equity, discussed in Campbell [2000]. The Sharpe ratio is
the risk premium on equity divided by the standard deviation of
the excess return on equity. In the long samples shown in Table
IV, the Sharpe ratio is around 0.3. In the model, using the base-
line parameters (Table V, column (2)), the ratio for the unlevered
861 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETScase is 0.036/0.046  0.8. Thus, the risk premium is “too high”
relative to the volatility of returns. My conjecture is that the
introduction of variations in pt would generate a closer match
between observed and theoretical Sharpe ratios. That is, the
standard deviation of the excess return on stocks would increase,
but the risk premium may not change greatly. This outcome
would be anticipated if variations in pt are mostly orthogonal to
current real GDP and consumption.
VIII. CAPITAL FORMATION
The model neglected investment, that is, changes in the
quantity of capital in the form of trees. Therefore, growth and
ﬂuctuations resulted from variations in the productivity of capi-
tal, At, with the quantity of capital, K, assumed ﬁxed. To assess
the implications of capital formation, it is convenient to consider
the opposite setting, that is, a ﬁxed productivity of capital, A,
with the quantity of capital, Kt, allowed to vary.
The production function takes the “AK” form:
(28) Yt  AKt,
where Yt is output of fruit, Kt is the number of trees, and A  0
is constant.
36 Output can be consumed (as fruit) or invested (as
seed). The process of creating new trees through planting seeds is
assumed, unrealistically, to be rapid enough so that, as in the
conventional one-sector production framework, the fruit price of
trees (capital) is pegged at a price normalized to one. In other
words, I ignore adjustment costs for investment. This setting
corresponds to having “Tobin’s q” always equal to one—unlike in
the previous model, where the market price of trees was variable.
Depreciation of trees occurs at rate t  0. This rate includes
a normal depreciation rate, 0, plus a stochastic term, vt, that
reﬂects the types of disasters considered before. With probability
p  0 in each period, a disaster occurs that wipes out the fraction
b of the trees. As before, the idea is that p is small but b is large.
Since the price of trees is ﬁxed at one, the one-period gross
return on tree equity can be calculated immediately as
(29) Rt1
e  1  A    vt1.
36. Temporary ﬂuctuations in A can be added to the model without affecting
the main results. However, a positive trend in A tends now to generate rising
growth rates of output and capital stock.
862 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSThe assumed distribution for vt1 implies that the expected gross
return on equity is
(30) EtRt1
e   1  A    p  Eb.
The usual asset-pricing formulas still apply. For equity—
which has to be priced in equilibrium at one—the formula is
(31) Ct

  e
  EtCt1

  1  A    vt1	.
For the risk-free bill return, the result is
(32) Ct

  e
  Rt1
f  EtCt1

	,
where Rt1
f is the one-period gross risk-free return. (A probability
of default on bills could be added.)
To determine the risk-free return in (32), we have to know
how output Yt divides up each period between consumption Ct
and gross investment It. In the present model, a change in the
single state variable Kt will generate equiproportionate responses
of the optimally chosen Ct and It. That is, It will be a constant
proportion  of Kt. Using this fact in the context of (31) allows for
the determination of . The result, as the length of the period
approaches zero, is
(33)     1/
 A      p  E1  b
1
  p	.
Since 0  b  1, an increase in p raises —the saving rate—if

1.
Using (32), the formula for  determines the risk-free return:
(34) Rt1
f  1  A    p  E1  b

  p  E1  b
1
.
Using the formula for the risk-free bill return from (30), the
equity premium is
(35) equity premium  EtRt1
e   Rt1
f
 p  E1  b

  E1  b
1
  Eb	.
This formula is the same as (13) from the original model, except
for the omission of terms involving background noise  and de-
fault probability on bills, q.
The model with investment determines the growth rate of the
economy, that is, the growth rate of the number of trees, Kt1/
Kt  1, which equals the growth rate of output, Yt1/Yt  1. As
the period length approaches zero, the growth rate approaches
863 RARE DISASTERS AND ASSET MARKETS(36) Kt1/Kt  1      vt1
 1/
 A      p  E1  b
1
  p	  vt1.
The expected growth rate is
(37) EtKt1/Kt  1  1/
 A    
 p  1/
 E1  b
1
  1	  Eb.
The net effect of p on the expected growth rate is ambiguous—the
positive effect of p on  (if 
1) is offset by the direct negative
impact of p on the expected growth rate.
IX. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The allowance for low-probability disasters, suggested by
Rietz [1988], explains a lot of puzzles about asset returns. More-
over, this approach achieves these explanations while maintain-
ing the tractable framework of a representative agent, time-
additive and isoelastic preferences, complete markets, and i.i.d.
shocks to productivity growth. The framework can be extended
from Lucas’ ﬁxed-number-of-trees model to a setting with capital
formation.
A natural next step is to extend the model to incorporate
stochastic, persisting variations in the disaster probability pt.
This extension means that shocks are no longer i.i.d.; therefore,
the analysis will be technically more difﬁcult. With time-varying
disaster probability, the empirical analysis could be extended to
measure pt and to relate these probabilities to asset returns and
consumption. Options prices on the overall stock market might
help in the measurement of pt.
37 Other possibilities include in-
surance premiums, contract prices in betting markets, and prices
of precious commodities, such as gold and diamonds.
Another extension expands the asset menu to include real
estate, so that housing prices could be related to disaster proba-
bilities. The model’s structure could also be generalized to allow
for variations in the growth-rate parameter . Some of this varia-
tion could involve business-cycle movements—then the model
might have implications for cyclical variations in rates of return
and the equity premium. In an international context, a distinc-
37. Xavier Gabaix made this suggestion. Santa-Clara and Yan [2005] use
S&P options prices to gauge the probability of jumps, which relate to the rare
events that I consider.
864 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICStion between local and global disasters could be applied to events
such as regional ﬁnancial crises.
In an international setting, the model has implications for
failures of interest-rate parity conditions. Kugler and Weder
[2005] observe that interest rates on Swiss-franc-denominated
assets have been lower in the long run than those on deposits
denominated in other major currencies after taking account of
observed variations in exchange rates. Their favored explanation,
consistent with the rare-disasters framework, is a “reverse-peso”
problem. That is, investors anticipated that the Swiss franc
would appreciate relative to other currencies in response to a
disaster event—notably a major war—which happened not to
materialize within sample. The rare-disasters framework may
also help to explain some of the well-known short-run deviations
from interest-rate parity conditions among other OECD
countries.
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